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Abstract. We examine the reason why two opposing views on distressed
banks’ lending behavior in Japan’s postbubble period have coexisted: one is stag-
nant lending in a capital crunch and the other is forbearance lending to low-quality
borrowers. To this end, we address the measurement problem for bank balance sheet
risk. We identify the credit supply and allocation eﬀects of bank capital in the bank
loan equation speciﬁed at the loan level, thereby ﬁnding that the “parallel worlds”,
or the two opposing views, emerge because the regulatory capital does not reﬂect the
actual condition of increased risk on bank balance sheets, while the market value of
capital does. By uncovering banks’ eﬀorts to increase regulatory capital in Japan’s
postbubble period, we show that banks with low market capitalization, and which
had diﬃculty in building up adequate equity capital for their risk exposure, decreased
the overall supply of credit. Parallel worlds can emerge whenever banks are allowed
to overvalue assets at their discretion, as in Japan’ postbubble period.
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“Additional lending to low credit rating ﬁrms was a counterintuitive criti-
cism, especially for business people involved in bank lending. Such forbearance
lending was very rare. Bank loan oﬃcers, making every eﬀort to reduce their
lending, were bitterly resentful of forbearance lending. It was quite strange
that two types of criticism of distressed Japanese banks’ lending behavior—
stagnant lending and forbearance lending—coexisted in the post-bubble pe-
riod.” Miyauchi (2015, p. 278)
1. Introduction Of the ﬁnancial crises in developed economies, the one in Japan after
the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s was unprecedented in terms of the
length and depth of the subsequent economic downturn.1 Debates about the reasons for
Japan’s prolonged stagnation have been raised accordingly (e.g., Motonishi and Yoshikawa
(1999), Hayashi and Prescott (2002), and Hoshi and Kashyap (2004)), and the lending
behavior of banks with impaired capital has been one of the most plausible explanations,
as the postbubble period witnessed the malfunction of the banking system.
When a substantial adverse shock hits the economy and many borrowers become insol-
vent, banks should theoretically face impaired capital, irrespective of whether their bank
capital is evaluated at regulatory or market values. The theoretical literature predicts two
types of lending behaviors by such impaired banks: one is stagnant lending in a capital
crunch, and the other is forbearance lending. In the former type of lending, impaired banks
that are subject to capital constraints decrease credit to borrowers, irrespective of whether
they are good or bad borrowers.2 In the latter type, however, the impaired banks conduct
window-dressing to avoid the realization of capital losses, and thus allocate more credit
to insolvent borrowers, while hoping that their situations will improve.3 These two prac-
tices have diﬀerent theoretical backgrounds, but they have often been accused of being the
1 See, e.g., Hoshi (2001) for a discussion of Japan’s bubble economy and its collapse in the early 1990s.
2 Bernanke and Lown (1991) deﬁned a credit crunch as “a signiﬁcant leftward shift in the supply curve
for loans, holding constant both the safe real interest rate and the quality of potential borrowers”, and
related a credit crunch to a capital crunch, providing evidence on the US economic crisis in the early 1990s.
The theoretical literature on capital crunches includes Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997), Calomiris and Wilson
(2004), and Diamond and Rajan (2011).
3 The theoretical literature about forbearance lending includes Diamond (2001), Caballero et al. (2008),
and Bruche and Llobet (2014).
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source of the prolonged stagnation experienced since the 1990s in Japan.4
The two opposing explanations of the lending practices of impaired banks share the
premise that the impaired banks worried considerably about the further deterioration of
their balance sheets, but these opposing views diﬀer sharply in explaining impaired banks’
lending behavior: stagnant lending in a capital crunch involves the issue of overall credit
undersupply to all borrowers, whereas forbearance lending involves the issue of credit alloca-
tion to low-quality borrowers. The empirical literature, however, has surprisingly provided
mixed evidence supporting the two opposing views on the lending behavior of distressed
Japanese banks in the postbubble period, as in Peek and Rosengren (2005), Gan (2007),
and Watanabe (2007). In this paper, we explore the reason why such parallel worlds of dis-
tressed banks’ lending behavior emerged in empirical investigations, particularly focusing
on the misperception problem for bank balance sheet (bank default) risk.
Models of banking under asymmetric information have emphasized the potential con-
ﬂict of interest between banks and depositors (see, e.g., Diamond (1984) and Calomiris
and Wilson (2004)). This information problem faced by banks encourages them to oﬀer
short-term (demandable) low-risk debt, concentrating most balance sheet risk in their cap-
ital and thus insulating depositors from this risk. Therefore, it is important to determine
whether banks are well capitalized enough to absorb their balance sheet risk and stabilize
the banking system. In the postbubble period in Japan, the misperception problem for
bank balance sheet risk occurred simultaneously with the introduction of regulatory cap-
ital standards, although they were introduced to prevent an overall undersupply of credit
in a capital crunch or prevent excessive risk taking by impaired banks in forbearance lend-
ing. Figure 1 shows the bank market capital ratio and regulatory capital surplus in the
postbubble period in Japan. We observe that the regulatory capital ratio continued to
increase during the 1990s, while the market value of bank capital continued to decrease.
This indicates that Japanese banks window-dressed their regulatory capital ratio, although
they faced substantive increases in their default risk as measured by their market value.
Indeed, the correlation between the two capital measures is −0.83, and hence they imply
seemingly contradicting information on bank capital deﬁcits. The postbubble period in
4 Stagnant bank lending is well known in Japanese as kashishiburi, and forbearance lending as oigashi.
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Japan saw a considerable divergence of regulatory capital from its market value; thus, this
period provides a good natural experiment that allows us to investigate whether and how
such a divergence between the bank regulatory and market capital measures aﬀects our un-
derstanding of prevailing patterns of the lending behavior of troubled banks. In particular,
we address the problem of the coexistence of two opposing views of the lending behavior
of distressed Japanese banks in terms of the misperception problem for bank balance sheet
risk, thereby demonstrating that the use of regulatory capital as a measure of bank balance
sheet risk would lead to erroneous assessments of bank lending behavior.
Our study of the misperception of bank balance sheet risk and lending behavior extends
recent empirical studies. Haldane (2014) and Bulow and Klemperer (2015) pointed out
that regulatory measures of bank capital do not have predictive power for bank failures.
Indeed, Bears Sterns, Wachovia, Washington Mutual, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac were
all viewed by regulators as being well capitalized immediately before their failures. Haldane
and Madouros (2012) and Sarin and Summers (2016) attempted to measure bank risk using
both regulatory measures (e.g., the Basel III Tier I ratio) and market measures (e.g., credit
default swaps and price–earnings ratios), and found that the market capital ratio (the
market value of equity relative to total assets) has the most explanatory power in predicting
bank failure. In addition, the market capital ratio of US major banks has declined not only
in the precrisis period, but also after the crisis (Sarin and Summers (2016)).5 These
studies focused on the misperception problem for bank balance sheet risk. However, our
study examines this issue by addressing the possibility that such a misperception problem
would cause erroneous assessments of bank lending behavior and lead to the coexistence of
the two opposing views about it, as in the late 1990s in Japan. Because the late 1990s in
Japan was a pre-banking-crisis period as well as a postbubble period, our analysis of this
period should provide rich insights into the arrival of the banking crisis.
In this paper, to investigate the coexistence problem, we use a loan-level matched
dataset of Japanese banks and their listed borrowers in the postbubble period of the late
5 Adrian and Shin (2014) theoretically explained the reason for the distinction between a bank’s book
leverage and its market capitalization and enterprise value in terms of its value-at-risk management. In
terms of banks’ window-dressing of their trading books, Begley et al. (2017) empirically showed that US
banks are prone to underreport the risk in their trading books when their equity capital decreases.
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1990s, as in Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Gan (2007). This is partially because loan-
level data enable us to overcome the identiﬁcation problem in terms of the controllability
of demand factors in specifying the bank loan equation, and partially because testing the
forbearance lending by lowly capitalized banks to their low-quality borrowers requires the
inclusion of a ﬁrm performance variable in the bank loan equation. Loan-level data are
superior to bank- and ﬁrm-level panel data in terms of data structure for overcoming the
omitted-variable problem because of the diﬃculty of controlling borrower-side factors in
the bank loan equation (see Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Jime´nez et al. (2012; 2014)).
Our analytical focus is on the eﬀect of changes in bank capital (regulatory capital or
market capital) BCAPit on the “allocation” of bank credits ΔLOAN
j
it among good and
bad borrowers as well as on the “supply” of credits to those borrowers. The novelty
of our analysis is that we strictly deﬁne the credit supply and the allocation eﬀect as
the ﬁrst and the second derivative eﬀects in the bank loan equation speciﬁed at the loan
level. More concretely, the credit supply eﬀect of bank capital involves the ﬁrst derivative
∂ΔLOANjit/∂ BCAPit in the bank loan equation, which is the focus of previous studies
that found the existence of a capital crunch, irrespective of whether they used loan-level
(Gan (2007)) or bank-level data (Watanabe (2007)). The credit allocation eﬀect, however,
involves the coeﬃcient of an interaction term between the bank capital ratio and a ﬁrm
performance variable FIRMjt , or the second derivative ∂
2ΔLOANjit/∂ FIRM
j
t ∂ BCAPit, which
Peek and Rosengren (2005) used to show that forbearance lending prevailed in Japan’s
postbubble period using loan-level matched data.
A positive ﬁrst derivative implies that a capital crunch, or stagnant lending by lowly
capitalized banks, prevailed in the postbubble/precrisis period of the late 1990s. Conversely,
if the ﬁrst derivative is negative for low-quality borrowers and the second derivative is
positive (where the ﬁrm performance variable is deﬁned so that its value become larger
as the ﬁrm’s performance improves), credit misallocation from lowly capitalized banks to
low-quality borrowers occurred. We focus on the signs of the two derivatives, and especially
whether and how the divergence of regulatory capital from its market value produces the
two opposing views on distressed banks’ lending behavior.
We ﬁnd that the use of regulatory capital as a proxy of bank balance sheet risk pro-
4
vides evidence supporting forbearance lending in which lowly capitalized banks did not
increase or decrease credits, but the credits were allocated more to low-quality borrowers
in the postbubble period, as demonstrated by Peek and Rosengren (2005); that is, regu-
latory capital produces insigniﬁcant and signiﬁcantly positive estimates for the ﬁrst and
second derivatives, respectively. This result is observed only in the bank group with a
larger regulatory capital buﬀer, and accordingly, it is quite consistent with the hypothesis
of Peek and Rosengren (2005) that Japanese banks engaged in the window-dressing and
patching-up of regulatory capital or the bank capital ratio. Conversely, the use of the
market value of bank capital provides evidence for the existence of a capital crunch, in
which lowly market-capitalized banks decreased credit to all borrowers even if they were
good borrowers, as demonstrated by Gan (2007) and Watanabe (2007); that is, market
capital produces signiﬁcantly positive and insigniﬁcant estimates for the ﬁrst and second
derivatives, respectively. In contrast to the result for the regulatory capital measure, this
result for the market measure does not qualitatively diﬀer among bank groups (with lower,
medium, and higher market capital ratios), but does quantitatively diﬀer in that equity
capital constraints in lending are more pronounced for banks in the lower market capital
group. The above ﬁndings are robust even if we control for the survivorship bias for bank–
ﬁrm relationships, employ the same type of nonlinear speciﬁcation as Peek and Rosengren
(2005), and use banks’ lending exposure to real estate in the bubble period instead of the
market capital measure, as in Gan (2007) and Watanabe (2007).
The above ﬁndings reveal the true lending behavior of Japanese banks in the postbubble
(pre-banking-crisis) period of the late 1990s. By simultaneously controlling for the two
bank capital measures and their interaction eﬀects in the bank loan model, we ﬁnd that
the supply and allocation eﬀects (the ﬁrst and second derivative eﬀects) of the regulatory
capital ratio completely vanish, and that only the supply eﬀect of the market capital ratio
survives; that is, in reality, stagnant lending following a capital crunch occurred, and not
forbearance lending. This result is robust as it is independent of the selection of ﬁrm
performance variables.
Why does only the market capital ratio have an eﬀect, but not the regulatory capital
ratio? To address this question, we estimate a cross-sectional regression for bank capital
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structure, which is based on the standard corporate ﬁnance theory emphasizing “normal
market forces”: creditors require banks to build their capital to secure an adequate charter
value, or demand more equity protection from banks with more portfolio risk (see, e.g.,
Flannery and Rangan (2008) and Gropp and Heider (2010) for empirical studies on bank
capital structure; see, e.g., Hackbarth et al. (2006), Valencia (2016), and Corbae et al.
(2017) for theoretical studies). Through this capital structure regression, we ﬁnd that the
market capital ratio is determined by standard corporate ﬁnance variables, whereas the
regulatory capital ratio is not. This result is robust, and is independent of the levels of the
two capital measures, although the market capital ratio of banks with lower market capital
levels—banks facing a more severe capital crunch—is less sensitive to two determinants:
proﬁtability and asset volatility. Such insensitivity implies that lowly market-capitalized
banks have diﬃculty increasing their market capital ratio in accordance with their prof-
itability and uncertainty through issuing equity. Our ﬁndings from the capital structure
regression suggest that in explaining bank lending behavior in relation to the capital struc-
ture, how the capital structure is determined is important. Without investigating it, we
cannot identify the background mechanism through which the capital structure aﬀects
banks’ lending behavior.
Given this insight, the key drivers of a capital crunch because of insuﬃcient market
capitalization are the standard corporate ﬁnance determinants of bank capital structure.
Given that banks with lower market capital ratios have greater diﬃculty in acquiring a
level of equity capital appropriate to their proﬁtability and asset risk, we expect that the
inclusion of either or both of these two determinants of bank capital structure in the model
would eliminate the signiﬁcance of the market capital ratio in the bank loan equation.
To examine this conjecture, we also include each of the determinants of the bank capital
structure in the bank loan equation. We ﬁnd that only banks’ portfolio risk eliminates the
signiﬁcance of the market capital ratio. This implies that a key cause of a capital crunch is
lowly market-capitalized banks’ diﬃculty in acquiring appropriate levels of equity capital
given their asset risk. This ﬁnding provides a rich insight into the fundamental causes of
a capital crunch: when they try to increase risk exposure and take more risk in lending,
if banks cannot increase their market value of capital enough to absorb the risk, they will
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face equity capital constraints in lending. In addition, this tendency of a capital crunch is
more noticeable for banks with lower market values of capital.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature on distressed
banks’ lending behavior and ﬁnancial status in Japan, and then discusses the measurement
problem for bank balance sheet risk. Section 3 presents our empirical model and explains
our dataset. Section 4 reports the results of our empirical analysis and then shows that
the parallel worlds, or the two views of troubled banks’ lending behavior, will emerge
depending on whether regulatory capital or market capital is used as the proxy for bank
balance sheet risk. Section 5 examines the lending behavior of Japanese distressed banks by
simultaneously controlling for the two capital measures and the interaction between them.
In this section, we also explore the reason why parallel worlds emerge by investigating the
determinants of the two capital measures. Section 6 explores a key driver of the capital
crunch among the determinants of the bank capital structure, thereby providing an insight
into the lending framework of troubled banks. Section 7 oﬀers conclusions.
2. Bank Balance Sheet Risk and Lending Behavior In this section, we review
the literature on distressed banks’ lending behavior and ﬁnancial status in Japan, and then
discuss the measurement problem for bank balance sheet risk in assessing those lending
behaviors.
2.1. Literature on Lending by Troubled Japanese Banks Here, we brieﬂy review
previous research on the lending behavior of troubled Japanese banks, particularly focusing
on what measures they used as a proxy of bank balance sheet risk or bank default risk.
As discussed below, we focus on Peek and Rosengren (2005), Gan (2007), and Watanabe
(2007), partially because they allow us to highlight the measurement problem for bank
balance sheet risk in analyzing distressed banks’ lending behavior, and partially because,
like ours, the former two studies both used loan-level matched data, although they gave two
opposing views on distressed banks’ lending behavior in the postbubble (precrisis) period
in Japan.
One strand of empirical research on Japan’s lending by distressed banks focuses on a
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capital crunch, or a debt overhang, in the postbubble period in the 1990s.6 These recent
studies include Gan (2007) and Watanabe (2007). These two studies used each bank’s
lending exposure to the real estate industry in the real estate bubble of the late 1980s as
a proxy of bank balance sheet risk in the postbubble period. Watanabe (2007) used bank-
level panel data from 1995 to 2000 and utilized lending exposure to the real estate industry
as the instrumental variable for the regulatory capital ratio, thus providing evidence that a
capital crunch existed in the late 1990s.7 Like us, Gan (2007) used loan-level matched data
from 1994 to 1998, and thus demonstrated that banks with greater real estate exposure in
the late 1980s had larger reductions in lending to borrowers during the capital crunch of
the late 1990s.
In contrast to the above studies supporting the existence of a capital crunch, Peek and
Rosengren (2005) showed that banks’ window-dressing to avoid the realization of losses
on their balance sheets provided additional credit to low-quality ﬁrms in the postbubble
period. Like our study, theirs used loan-level matched data from 1994 to 1999, and they
included the regulatory capital ratio as a proxy of bank balance sheet risk in their bank loan
equations. In terms of the implementation of prudential policy, Giannettie and Simonov
(2013) examined the eﬀects of Japan’s three public capital injections in 1998, 1999, and
2003 on capital-injected banks’ lending behavior using loan-level data from 1998 to 2004.
They demonstrated that if capital-injected banks were still undercapitalized, those banks
were more likely to lend to low-quality borrowers, using the regulatory capital ratio as a
proxy of bank balance sheet risk.8
6 See Bernanke and Lown (1991), Peek and Rosengren (1995; 2000), Berrospide and Edge (2010), and
Carlson et al. (2013) for empirical research on capital crunches in the United States.
7 Using a bank-level panel dataset, Ito and Sasaki (2002) estimated a bank loan equation in Japan
from 1990 to 1993, as did Woo (2003) from 1991 to 1997, Ogawa (2003, Chapter 2) from 1992 to 1999,
Montgomery (2005) from 1982 to 1999, and Hosono (2006) from 1975 to 1999. They all found that a
decrease in the regulatory capital ratio caused a decrease in bank loans in the 1990s by including the
regulatory capital ratio in their bank loan equations. However, unlike Watanabe (2007) and Gan (2007),
they did not use an instrumental variable for the regulatory capital ratio, such as lending exposure to the
real estate industry in the late 1980s; hence, their empirical results appear to be less robust and dependent
on the sample periods used.
8 Unlike these two studies, Sekine et al. (2003) used ﬁrm-level panel data from 1986 to 1999, while
Watanabe (2010) used bank-level panel data from 1995 to 2000 and then included the bank book capital
ratio as a proxy of balance sheet risk in his bank loan equation. The former found that highly indebted
ﬁrms belonging to nonmanufacturing industries increased bank borrowings after 1993, although this lowered
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As reviewed above, previous research has focused on Japan’s bank lending behavior
mainly in the late 1990s, and has provided mixed evidence on the stagnant forbearance
lending of distressed banks. In this paper, we hypothesize that the coexistence of two
opposing views can be ascribed to the diﬀerence in the choice of proxy for bank balance
sheet risk used to assess the lending behavior of troubled banks. The research suggesting
the existence of a capital crunch uses banks’ lending exposure to the real estate industry
during the real estate bubble of the late 1980s as a proxy of bank balance sheet risk in
the postbubble period, as in Gan (2007) and Watanabe (2007), while those suggesting the
existence of forbearance lending used the regulatory capital ratio, as in Peek and Rosengren
(2005). One possible reason for such a measurement problem for bank balance sheet risk
in Japan is rooted in banks’ behavior under the regulatory policy implemented after the
introduction of the regulatory capital standards. In the next subsection, we review this
problem in the context of Japan’s regulatory policy for banks.
2.2. Misperception Problem for Bank Balance Sheet Risk In the postbubble/pre-
crisis period in Japan of the late 1990s, the measurement problem of bank balance sheet risk
emerged following the introduction of regulatory capital standards, although these stan-
dards were originally aimed at preventing stagnant lending in a capital crunch or excessive
risk taking by impaired banks in forbearance lending (see also Nakashima and Takahashi
(2018a) for details).
In 1988, bank regulators in major industrial countries agreed to standardize capital
requirements internationally, through the so-called Basel Accord. Subsequent to this, all
Japanese banks struggled to meet these capital standards in the 1990s. During this period
in Japan, land and stock prices fell continuously. Consequently, many loans granted during
the bubble period in the late 1980s became nonperforming. Accordingly, banks that were
more impaired and had less capital issued additional subordinated debt to inﬂate their
their proﬁtability, and the latter demonstrated that a tough regulatory stance that encouraged banks to
write oﬀ nonperforming loans produced a large loss of bank capital that induced bank lending to shift to
low-quality borrowers. Caballero et al. (2008) addressed the more speciﬁc issue of the misallocation of
bank credit toward low-quality borrowers, which is known as “zombie lending” (see also Hoshi (2006)).
They used ﬁrm-level panel data from 1981 to 2002, thereby demonstrating that the increase in the number
of zombie ﬁrms would suppress the investment and employment growth of nonzombies.
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bank capital. They were able to do so because, under the local Japanese rules governing
capital requirements, subordinated debt can be counted as Tier II capital (see, e.g., Ito and
Sasaki (2002) and Montgomery (2005)). Japanese banks also used deferred tax assets to
compensate for capital losses arising from unrealized losses on their holding stocks. This is
because the government allowed banks to include their deferred tax assets in Tier I capital
in 1998. At their discretion, bank managers estimated subjectively the total amount of
deferred tax assets (see Skinner (2008)).
In the 1990s, these regulatory forbearance policies caused Japanese banks to engage
in “patching up” their regulatory (that is, book) capital ratios (see, e.g., Shrieves and
Dahl (2003)). In the late 1990s, the attitude of the Japanese government and regulatory
authorities toward Japanese banks started to change, and they allowed them to enter
bankruptcy or receive a capital injection. In 1998 and 1999, the government of Japan
decided to infuse a large amount of capital into poorly capitalized banks in order to increase
their capital adequacy ratios. These large-scale public capital injections allowed almost all
Japanese banks to meet their capital standards (see, e.g., Watanabe (2007), Nakashima
(2016), and Guizani and Watanabe (2016) on the Japanese bank recapitalization programs).
However, the amount of nonperforming loans in Japanese banks only started to decrease
after the Financial Revitalization Program, or the so-called Takenaka Plan, was executed
in 2002 (see Sakuragawa and Watanabe (2009) for details).
Figure 1 shows the bank market capital ratio (deﬁned as the ratio of the market value of
bank equity to the market value of total assets) and the regulatory capital surplus (deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between a bank’s reported capital adequacy ratio and its regulatory target
ratio, i.e., 8% for international banks and 4% for domestic banks) in the postbubble period
in Japan. As shown in this ﬁgure, the regulatory capital ratio continued to increase during
the 1990s because of Japan’s regulatory forbearance policies, while the market capital
ratio continued to decrease because equity market participants believed that Japanese
banks window-dressed their regulatory capital by overvaluing their capital and undervaluing
their nonperforming loans (see Hoshi and Kashyap (2004; 2010)). In fact, the correlation
coeﬃcient of the two variables is −0.83 at the aggregate level. This tendency for the market
value of capital and the regulatory capital to diverge from each other, reﬂecting diﬀerent
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information on banks’ risk proﬁles, is also clearly observed in Figure 2, where the two
variables appear to be negatively correlated in the postbubble period.
To illustrate some individual cases, Figure 3 shows the market capital ratio and the
regulatory capital surplus of Fukutoku Bank and the Long-Term Credit Bank (LTCB),
which went bankrupt in May 1998 and October 1998, respectively. The market capital
ratio of Fukutoku Bank continued to decrease during the postbubble period, while its
regulatory capital surplus rose sharply before bankruptcy. The regulatory capital surplus
of LTCB increased from the mid 1990s, partially because of the public capital injection in
March 1998, while its market capital ratio continued to decrease until it went bankrupt.
This negative correlation between the two capital measures is also observed in other banks
that went bankrupt in the 1990s, including Hyogo Bank and the Nippon Credit Bank.
Such distinct diﬀerences in the information content of banks’ risk proﬁles are also ob-
served in the relation between banks’ lending exposure to the real estate industry during
the real estate bubble of 1989 and regulatory capital. The left panel of Figure 4 shows
that regulatory capital has little or no correlation with bank lending exposure to the real
estate industry, with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.06. As shown in the right panel of Figure
4 however, the market value of capital and bank lending exposure to the real estate in-
dustry are negatively correlated with a correlation coeﬃcient of −0.46, indicating that the
bank market capital ratio in the postbubble period reﬂects information on bank lending
exposure to the real estate industry in the bubble period. Given that the decline in real
estate prices in the 1990s caused a deterioration of bank balance sheets, the negative corre-
lation indicates that the market value of bank capital is likely to capture the soundness of
bank balance sheets more precisely (see Gan (2007)) and Watanabe (2007)). In Subsection
5.3, we will identify the determinants of the two capital measures in terms of standard
corporate ﬁnance theory emphasizing market forces, thereby examining why and how the
two measures contain diﬀerent information on bank balance sheets and produce the two
opposing views of troubled banks’ lending behavior.
Given that large Japanese banks received capital injections around 2000, when the bank-
ing crisis occurred, the above discussion provides an insight into the measurement problem
for bank balance sheet risk; that is, the market value of bank capital (or bank lending ex-
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posure to the real estate industry) can capture bank default risk in the postbubble period
in the 1990s, while regulatory capital cannot capture it because troubled Japanese banks
were allowed to overvalue their portfolios at their partial discretion under the framework
of the Basel Accords. As discussed in the Introduction, this insight is consistent with the
ﬁndings of recent empirical studies on the misperception problem for bank balance sheet
(or bank default) risk before and after the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis (Haldane and Madouros
(2012) and Sarin and Summers (2016)), which demonstrated that the market capital ratio
had outstanding explanatory power in predicting bank failures before the crisis, but the
regulatory capital ratio did not.
With due consideration of such a misperception problem for bank balance sheet risk, we
have the legitimate expectation that any conclusion about the lending behavior of distressed
banks depends heavily on which of the two measures is used as a proxy of bank balance
sheet risk. In the following, we will untangle this misperception problem for bank balance
sheet risk and lending behavior by analyzing the bank loan equation.
3. Empirical Speciﬁcation and Data In this section, we start by introducing an
empirical speciﬁcation for bank lending to examine the measurement problem for bank
balance sheet risk and bank lending behavior, and then discuss the estimation methods
and our dataset.
3.1. Speciﬁcation for Bank Loan Equations and Estimation Method As dis-
cussed in the Introduction, we use a loan-level matched dataset of Japanese banks and
their listed borrowers to identify the eﬀect of bank capital on lending in Japan’s postbub-
ble period, as in Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Gan (2007). The loan-level matched data
allow us not only to control for borrower-side factors through time*ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, but
also to analyze the credit allocation eﬀect through the (second derivative) eﬀect of the inter-
action between bank capital and ﬁrm performance variables. To exploit these advantages
of the loan-level matched data, we specify the bank loan equation as follows:
ΔLOANjit = a0 + a1BCAPit−1 + a2BCAPit−1 ∗ FIRMjt−1 + vi + ujt + εjit, (1)
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where the dependent variable, ΔLOANjit, indicates the growth rate of the total amount of
loans outstanding between bank i and domestic listed ﬁrm j at time t. vi denotes bank i’s
time-invariant ﬁxed eﬀects to control for its time-invariant unobservables, while ujt denotes
ﬁrm j’s time-varying ﬁxed eﬀects, or year ∗ uj with time dummies (year), to control for
the borrowing ﬁrm’s total demand factors at each sample period t. εjit is the stochastic
disturbance term.
As for an observable explanatory variable, BCAPit denotes a ﬁnancial variable for bank
i that is supposed to capture the adequacy of bank capital and the increase in bank default
risk: either bank i’s market capital ratio (MARCAPit) or its regulatory capital surplus
(REGCAPit).9 FIRM
j
t is ﬁrm j’s performance variable. In this paper, instead of using
conventional measures of proﬁtability such as the return on assets and the working capital
ratio, we use two equity-based measures of franchise values for a ﬁrm’s business performance
in the future: Tobin’s q (FQjt ) and the distance to default (FDD
j
t ). The reason is that these
equity-based measures better capture a ﬁrm’s current and future proﬁtability than the
conventional proﬁtability measures based on its past proﬁt.10 Considering that banks
tend to place more importance on a borrower’s future performance when they evaluate
default risk, the equity-based measures are more appropriate for examining their lending
behavior. Tobin’s q is deﬁned as the ratio of the market value of ﬁrm i (VA) to its book
value, where the market value of the borrowing ﬁrm is deﬁned as the sum of the market
value of its equity (VE) and the book value of its total liabilities (D).
11 The distance to
default is deﬁned as
FDD =
{
ln (VA/D) +
(
r − 1
2
σ2A
)}
/σA,
9 As discussed in Subsection 2.2, the bank market capital ratio is deﬁned as the market value of a bank’s
equity divided by the market value of its total assets, where the market value of a bank’s total assets
is deﬁned as the sum of the market value of its equity and the book value of its total liabilities. We
calculate the market value of equity by multiplying the end-of-year stock price by the number of shares.
The regulatory capital surplus is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between a bank’s reported regulatory capital
ratio and its regulatory target ratio (8% for international banks and 4% for domestic banks).
10 We do not use the distance to default as an equity-based measure of bank default risk. This is because
the usual assumption of log-normally distributed asset values in structural models of default risk is not
appropriate for banks because of the special nature of their assets. See Nagel and Purnanandam (2018)
for details.
11 We calculate the market value of ﬁrm equity by multiplying the end-of-year stock price by the number
of shares. Firm book value is the book value of total assets.
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where r is the risk-free rate, and σA is the volatility of ﬁrm assets. The distance to default
can be interpreted as the expected standardized diﬀerence between the market value of the
ﬁrm and the book value of its liabilities. If the diﬀerence is small (large), a ﬁrm is in danger
of bankruptcy (healthy). A decrease (increase) in distance-to-default implies greater (lesser)
credit risk. We deﬁne the volatility of ﬁrm assets σA as σA = σE × VE/VA. To estimate the
volatility of equity (σE), we calculate the standard deviation of the market value of equity
for the ﬁnal month of a ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year and express the estimated volatility as an annual
rate.12 We use the yield on one-year Japanese government bonds as a proxy of the risk-free
rate (r). In this paper, we focus mainly on the estimation results obtained using Tobin’s
q because it can easily classify borrowing ﬁrms as good or bad at the reference value of
100: if Tobin’s q is not less than 100, the borrowing ﬁrm is categorized as a good borrower;
otherwise, it is classiﬁed as a bad one. The equation additionally includes lending exposure
and borrowing exposure as relationship variables. The lending exposure is deﬁned as loans
from bank i to ﬁrm j divided by the total loans of bank i. The borrowing exposure is
deﬁned in the same manner, as loans from bank i to ﬁrm j divided by the total borrowings
of ﬁrm j.
Note that to control for borrower-side factors in our bank loan equation with ujt, we
employ the ﬁxed-eﬀects approach proposed by Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Jime´nez et al.
(2012; 2014). The ﬁxed-eﬀects approach assumes that all potential borrower-side factors
are embodied in time-varying ﬁrm unobservables, which are captured by time*ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects (ujt).
13 This approach enables us not only to specify our lending equation in a more
parsimonious way, as expressed in equation (1), but also to identify the eﬀect of bank capital
12 More speciﬁcally, we calculate the annualized estimated volatility of the market value of equity as
follows:
σEE,jt =
√√√√√ 1
D(t)− 1
D(t)∑
d(t)=1
(
retj,d(t) − retj,t
)2 ×√D(t),
where d(t) (d(t) = 1, · · · , D(t)) indexes trading days in ﬁrm j’s ﬁscal year t. retj,d(t) denotes the daily rate
of change in equity valuation, and retj,d(t) is the average rate of change in equity valuation during ﬁscal
year t.
13 Hosono and Miyakawa (2014) and Nakashima (2016) employed this ﬁxed-eﬀects approach with Japanese
loan-level matched data. The former identiﬁed the eﬀects of monetary policy on bank loan supply through
the bank balance sheet channel, while the latter examined the eﬀects of Japan’s public capital injections
on bank lending.
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on lending more rigorously by controlling for demand factors in a more comprehensive way.
In the following analyses, we use equation (1) as the benchmark model, where borrower-side
factors are fully controlled with time*ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
By controlling for lender-side factors as well as borrower-side ones with the ﬁxed-eﬀects
approach through time*bank ﬁxed eﬀects, one can focus on the interaction eﬀects and
examine the issue of credit allocation in a more robust way. More speciﬁcally, we introduce
the following speciﬁcation for bank loans:
ΔLOANjit = a0 + a2BCAPit−1 ∗ FIRMjt−1 + vit + ujt + εjit, (2)
where we control for all potential lender-side factors by utilizing time-varying unobservables
vit. We also examine the interaction eﬀects, or the second derivative eﬀects, on credit
allocation using this double ﬁxed-eﬀects approach (see Jime´nez et al. (2014) and Nakashima
et al. (2018) for the double ﬁxed-eﬀects approach).14
Like our study, Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Gan (2007) used loan-level matched
data, but their way of specifying the bank loan equation is diﬀerent from ours. Peek and
Rosengren (2005) transformed the growth data of bank loans into binary outcome data,
and then employed a random-eﬀects probit model. We use a linear rather than a nonlinear
model of bank lending for two reasons. First, nonlinear models tend to produce biased
estimates in panel datasets with many ﬁxed eﬀects, leading to an incidental parameters
problem and inconsistent estimates. Second, nonlinear ﬁxed-eﬀects models generate biased
estimates of interaction eﬀects (see Ai and Norton (2003) for details). Nonetheless, we also
employ their nonlinear speciﬁcation, thereby attempting to conduct a robustness check
for the estimation results based on our linear speciﬁcation. However, like our approach,
Gan (2007) speciﬁed a lending equation in a linear regression model but, unlike ours, did
not control for banks’ unobservables, and controlled for ﬁrms’ unobservables through time-
invariant ﬁxed eﬀects.
14 Jime´nez et al. (2014) and Nakashima et al. (2018) employed the double ﬁxed-eﬀects approach to
identify the risk-taking channel of monetary policy in bank lending, which involves the issue of whether
and how monetary policy induces banks to change their credit allocation from ﬁrms with lower credit risk
to ones with higher credit risk.
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Note that Peek and Rosengren (2005) used regulatory capital surplus as a proxy for bank
balance sheet risk and focused on the interaction terms between this bank ﬁnancial variable
and ﬁrm performance variables. However, instead of using the bank capital ratio, Gan
(2007) used banks’ lending exposures to the real estate industry in 1989 in order to identify
loan supply eﬀects of banks’ impaired capital. In contrast to these two studies, Watanabe
(2007) used a bank-level panel dataset and then used lending exposure to real estate as the
instrumental variable of the regulatory capital ratio, thus providing evidence that a capital
crunch existed in the late 1990s. In Section 4, we also apply these speciﬁcations to our
data as a robustness test.
The advantage of our loan-level analysis based on equations (1) and (2) is that we
identify the credit supply and the allocation eﬀects as the ﬁrst and second derivative eﬀects,
respectively. In these speciﬁcations, the ﬁrst derivative, ∂ΔLOANjit/∂ BCAPit−1 = a1 +
a2FIRM
j
t−1, captures the eﬀect of bank capital changes on credit supply, and the second
derivative, ∂2ΔLOANjit/∂ FIRM
j
t ∂ CAPit = a2, measures the bank capital eﬀect on credit
allocation among better- and worse-performing ﬁrms. If the ﬁrst derivative has a positive
value for all values of the ﬁrm performance variable FIRMjt−1, then a capital crunch prevails
in a period of bank distress. However, if the ﬁrst derivative has a negative value for
low-quality ﬁrms (e.g., with a lower Tobin’s q) and the second derivative has a positive
value, forbearance lending by lowly capitalized banks to low-quality ﬁrms prevails. We
examine whether and how the two bank capital measures produce the two opposing views
on distressed banks’ lending behavior by focusing on the ﬁrst and the second derivatives,
or the credit supply and allocation eﬀects of bank capital.
3.2. Correcting for Survivorship Bias Our matched lender–borrower sample is based
on a continuation of the lending relationship. According to the literature on relationship
banking, the continuation of a bank–ﬁrm relationship depends on both the bank’s and the
ﬁrm’s characteristics (Ongena and Smith (2001) and Nakashima and Takahashi (2018b)).
In other words, we must address the survivorship bias that may arise from nonrandom
assortative matching between banks and ﬁrms.
To correct for survivorship bias, we employ Heckman’s (1979) two-stage regression tech-
nique. The ﬁrst stage is a probit regression of relationship survival; the second stage is a
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regression of loan growth based on the estimation method discussed above. To the extent
that credit supply/allocation is a two-step process in which a bank ﬁrst decides whether to
lend and then decides how much to lend, the selection model provides an insight into both
decisions.
Our probit regression includes one-period lags of four banks’ characteristics such as the
market leverage ratio, six ﬁrms’ characteristics such as the interest coverage ratio, and three
relationship factors such as the duration of the relationship between lender i and borrowing
ﬁrm j. We estimate the probit regression for the continuation of bank–ﬁrm relationships
and then estimate the second-stage regression of the bank lending equation with the inverse
Mills ratio. To take into account the possibility that the coeﬃcients of the variables in the
probit model are time-varying, as pointed out by Nakashima and Takahashi (2018b), we
conduct a rolling estimation of the probit model year by year. The details of the estimation
results are shown in Appendix A.
3.3. Dataset The empirical analysis developed in this paper uses a loan-level dataset
comprising matched samples of Japanese banks and their borrowing ﬁrms listed in Japan.
We construct our loan-level data using the Corporate Borrowings from Financial Institu-
tions Database compiled by Nikkei Digital Media Inc. This database annually reports short-
(a maturity of one year or less) and long-term (a maturity of more than one year) loans
from each ﬁnancial institution for every listed company on any Japanese stock exchange.
The database includes some 120,000 observations, comprising more than 130 Japanese
banks, 2,000 listed borrowing ﬁrms, and 17,000 relationships for our sample period from
ﬁscal year (FY) 1992 to 1998, or the postbubble period in Japan. The reason why we set
up our sample period beginning from FY 1992 is that a set of minimum capital require-
ments for banks, known as Basel I, was fully implemented by March 1993, or the end of
FY 1992, in Japan. The reason why we end our sample period at FY 1998, or March
1999, is that important previous studies, such as Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Gan
(2007), demonstrating the two opposing views— stagnant lending in a capital crunch and
forbearance lending—focused on the postbubble period because the early 1990s witnessed
the dysfunction of the Japanese banking system because of the severe deterioration of bank
capital. Our dataset covers approximately 70% of all loans in the Japanese banking sector
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for our sample period. We combined the Nikkei database with the ﬁnancial statement data
of Japanese banks and their listed borrowing ﬁrms, also compiled by Nikkei Digital Media
Inc.15
Our chief diﬃculty in working with the loan-level data was sorting through various bank
mergers and restructures in our data. We recorded the date of all bankruptcies and mergers
that took place in the Japanese banking sector in our sample period. First, we should note
that whenever a bank ceased to exist in our data because of a bankruptcy, ﬁrms ceased
reporting that ﬁnancial institution as a source of loans. If ﬁrms ceased reporting a bank as
a lender and we could not ﬁnd any information on a bankruptcy or a merger of the lending
bank, we set the outstanding amount of loans from the bank equal to zero. However, if we
found evidence of a bankruptcy or merger of a bank and a ﬁrm had outstanding loans from
the restructured bank before that event, and from a surviving bank after that event, we
calculated the growth rate of the loan from the restructured bank as if the restructured bank
had made both of the loans.16 In order to calculate the loan growth rate of a restructured
bank, we traced to it all banks that predated it. Thus, if banks A and B merged in year t to
form bank C, bank C’s loans in year t− 1 were set equal to the sum of the loans for banks
A and B, and the growth rate of bank C’s loans in year t would be calculated accordingly.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for key variables, including the two bank capital
variables and the ﬁrm performance variables of Tobin’s q and the distance to default.
4. Emergence of Parallel Worlds In this section, we report the estimation results
for the two types of bank loan equations: that which uses the regulatory capital ratio and
that which uses the market capital ratio. We show that the use of the two diﬀerent capital
measures produces the two opposing views, or parallel worlds, on lending by troubled banks:
stagnant lending by banks with equity capital constraints and forbearance lending by banks
15 The end of the ﬁscal year for Japanese banks is March 31, but this is not necessarily the case for
borrowing ﬁrms. When combining the Nikkei database for loan-level data with the ﬁnancial statement
data of banks and their borrowing ﬁrms, we match bank-side information to borrower-side information in
the same ﬁscal year.
16 As for exits of some ﬁrms from our loan-level dataset in the middle of our full-sample period, we cannot
identify reasons for ﬁrm exit from our sample, including bankruptcy, management buyout, termination of
all the ﬁrm’s relationships, etc. Therefore, if a ﬁrm exited from the original data after year t, we dropped
the observation for the ﬁrm from our dataset in year t. Thus, if the ﬁrm’s last observation in the original
dataset was in t, our adjusted sample includes the ﬁrm’s observations until year t− 1.
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engaging in patching-up of their regulatory capital.
4.1. Credit Supply and Allocation Eﬀects We start by reporting the estimation
results for the supply eﬀect of bank capital on lending, or the ﬁrst derivative eﬀect, deﬁned
as ∂ΔLOANjit/∂ BCAPit−1 = a1 + a2FIRM
j
t−1. Table 2 shows the estimation results for the
coeﬃcient parameters a1 and a2, and Figure 5 shows the average supply eﬀects for good and
bad borrowers where borrowing ﬁrms are classiﬁed into two groups as follows: if Tobin’s
q is not less than 100, the borrowing ﬁrm is labeled as a “good borrower”; otherwise, it is
categorized as a “bad borrower”. As for the distance to default, a ﬁrm whose distance to
default is higher than the sample mean is categorized as a good borrower; otherwise, it is
classiﬁed as a bad one.
As shown in this ﬁgure, the use of the regulatory capital ratio yields a negative estimate
for the average supply eﬀect of a bad borrower with Tobin’s q equal to 50, although it is sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant. We also ﬁnd that the regulatory capital ratio produces signiﬁcantly
positive estimates for good borrowers with Tobin’s q values of 125 or more. These results
indicate that the decrease in regulatory capital increases credit to low-quality borrowers,
while decreasing credit to good borrowers during Japan’s postbubble period. When using
the distance to default, we have insigniﬁcant estimates for ﬁrms facing higher default risk
(whose distance to default is less than two), but signiﬁcantly positive estimates for ﬁrms
facing relatively lower credit risk (whose distance to default is greater than four).
The use of the market capital ratio however, produces signiﬁcantly positive values for
both good and bad borrowers. Furthermore, the result does not depend on whether Tobin’s
q or distance to default is used as the ﬁrm performance variable. This implies that a decrease
in market capitalization would reduce credit to all borrowers irrespective of borrowers’ risk
levels.
Table 2 also presents the estimation results for the credit allocation eﬀect of bank capital,
or the second derivative eﬀect: ∂2ΔLOANjit/∂ FIRM
j
t−1 ∂ BCAPit−1 = a2. This table shows
the credit allocation eﬀects for the double ﬁxed-eﬀects model (2) as well as the baseline
model (1).
We ﬁnd that the regulatory capital ratio yields signiﬁcantly positive estimates, and
this result is robust because both the baseline and the double ﬁxed-eﬀects models produce
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positive estimates. This indicates that banks with less regulatory capital allocate more
credit to borrowers with a lower Tobin’s q or distance to default.
In contrast, the market capital ratio produces conﬂicting results; that is, the double
ﬁxed-eﬀects model yields an insigniﬁcant estimate, while the baseline model yields a sig-
niﬁcantly negative one. This tendency does not change whether we use Tobin’s q or the
distance to default as the ﬁrm performance variable. Given that the double ﬁxed-eﬀects
model can control for both lender- and borrower-side factors more thoroughly, we should
attach more importance to the insigniﬁcant estimate based on this model. Hence, we in-
fer that the use of the market capital ratio provides evidence supporting the existence of
a capital crunch, in which banks with reduced equity capital would reduce credit to all
borrowers equally, irrespective of borrowers’ risk levels.
In addition, note that the inverse Mills ratio yields signiﬁcantly negative estimates,
implying that survivorship bias exists in such a way that we would obtain biased estimates
for the parameter coeﬃcients without including this ratio. We ﬁnd that this result is quite
robust to the use of alternative samples (see also Table 4).17
The above results are based on a linear speciﬁcation, as expressed in equations (1) and
(2). Table 3, panel (A) reports the estimation results obtained by employing the nonlinear
speciﬁcation of Peek and Rosengren (2005): the probit model with borrowing-ﬁrm random
eﬀects.18 We observe that even if we employ the nonlinear speciﬁcation, our ﬁndings are
robust: the use of regulatory capital provides evidence supporting forbearance lending,
while the use of the market value of bank capital provides evidence for the existence of a
capital crunch.
4.2. Lending Exposure to Real Estate in the Bubble Period As discussed in Sub-
section 2.1, Gan (2007) and Watanabe (2007) assume that bank lending exposure to the
real estate industry in Japan’s bubble period contains important information on Japanese
banks’ balance sheet risk in the postbubble period. Table 3, panel (B) reports the estima-
tion results obtained using bank lending exposure to real estate in 1989 instead of the two
17 Thus, we do not report the estimation results for the inverse Mills ratio except for Tables 2 and 4,
because of lack of space.
18 Note that Peek and Rosengren (2005) did not include lender-side unobservable covariates in their
nonlinear model. This may be because they treated only borrower-side mergers in their data construction.
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bank capital measures.19
Note that the estimation results based on the lending exposure to the real estate industry
are qualitatively the same as those obtained using the market capital ratio; that is, the
model produces signiﬁcant and insigniﬁcant estimates for the credit supply (ﬁrst derivative)
and allocation (second derivative) eﬀects, respectively. This implies not only that banks
with greater exposures to the real estate industry in the bubble period were more likely
to decrease credit to all borrowers, but also that the market capital ratio contains similar
information on Japanese banks’ lending behavior in the postbubble period to the banks’
exposure to the real estate industry in the bubble period in the late 1980s. Given that the
high exposure of banks to the real estate industry is considered a cause of the deterioration
of their balance sheets in the postbubble period that contributed to Japan’s banking crisis
in the late 1990s, the market capital ratio appears to be a more appropriate indicator for
capturing the relation between the condition of banks’ capital and their lending behavior.
4.3. Bank Lending with Low, Medium, and High Capital Ratios The capital
crunch and forbearance lending views involve the issue of how much (or how little) bank
capital is increased. To incorporate this issue into our analysis, we cluster our loan-level
sample into three subsamples for banks with high, medium, and low capital ratios for each
of the two capital ratio measures (i.e., market and regulatory). To construct the three
subsamples, we deﬁne banks belonging to the ﬁrst tertile (below the 34th percentile), the
second tertile (34th–67th percentiles), and the third tertile (above the 67th percentile) of all
banks as low, medium, and high capital banks, respectively. Table 4 shows the estimation
results for the bank loan equations for banks with low, medium, and high capital based on
the market and regulatory capital ratios.
In the upper panel (A), we ﬁnd that the estimated coeﬃcients for the market capital
ratio are signiﬁcantly positive for all three levels of the market capital ratio, but the esti-
mated values (approximately two) for banks with a low level of market capital are much
larger than those for banks with high and medium levels of market capital, each having
almost the same value (approximately one). These results do not depend on the choice of
19 In the speciﬁcation including lending exposure to real estate in the late 1980s, we do not include bank
ﬁxed eﬀects because the bank exposure variable is not time-varying.
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the ﬁrm performance variable (Tobin’s q or distance to default).
The estimation results for the regulatory capital ratio in the lower panel (B) are sub-
stantially diﬀerent from those for the market capital ratio: the interaction eﬀect, or the
credit allocation eﬀect, has signiﬁcantly positive estimates for banks with a high regula-
tory capital ratio. Furthermore, note that the results based on the subsample regression
for banks with a high regulatory capital ratio more clearly demonstrate the forbearance
lending by those banks, compared with the results based on the full-sample regression. In
addition, the market capital ratio of those high capital banks is much lower than those
of the two other bank groups in terms of the sample mean. These ﬁndings indicate that
banks that were more engaged in window-dressing and patching-up their regulatory capital
provided more credit to low-quality borrowers while those banks were facing low market
values of equity capital.
4.4. Banks with Impaired Regulatory Capital The above positive estimates for the
double interaction eﬀect, or the credit allocation eﬀect, based on the use of the regulatory
capital ratio, may only reﬂect that banks with increasing regulatory capital provided more
credit to high-quality borrowers; that is, the positive estimates could not identify forbear-
ance lending to low-quality borrowers by impaired banks. To further address this identiﬁ-
cation issue, we also include a triple interaction term, BDECit−1 ∗ REGCAPit−1 ∗ FIRMjt−1,
in the bank loan equations (1) and (2). BDECit−1 is a dummy variable revealing the banks
that decreased their regulatory capital from year t−2 to t−1. Approximately 35% of banks
in our sample were such capital-decreasing banks. If the triple interaction term has a posi-
tive coeﬃcient—or even if it is not positive, as long as the inclusion of it does not eliminate
the signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect of the double interaction term, REGCAPit−1 ∗ FIRMjt−1—
then this implies that banks with decreased regulatory capital provided more credit to
low-quality borrowers under forbearance lending.
Table 5 reports the estimation results with the inclusion of the triple interaction term.
As shown in the upper panel (A) for the full-sample regression, the triple interaction term
has a positive coeﬃcient, and the inclusion of it does not change the signiﬁcantly positive
eﬀect of the double interaction term. In the subsample regression, reported in panel (B),
the inclusion of the triple interaction term does not eliminate the signiﬁcantly positive
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eﬀect of the double interaction term for banks with high regulatory capital. These results
indicate that the positive estimates for the double interaction eﬀect capture forbearance
lending to low-quality borrowers by impaired banks.
4.5. Parallel Worlds of Japan’s Postbubble Period Summing up our estimation
results for the postbubble period in the late 1990s, the use of the market capital ratio and
bank lending exposure to the real estate industry in 1989 provides evidence supporting
the existence of a capital crunch, in which banks with impaired capital decreased credit
to ﬁrms irrespective of whether they were good or bad borrowers, as found by Gan (2007)
and Watanabe (2007). The degree of capital constraints in bank lending was higher for
banks with lower market capital; however, evidence of a capital crunch is widely observed,
regardless of the value of the market capital ratio. However, the use of the regulatory capital
ratio provides evidence supporting the existence of forbearance lending, in which impaired
banks increased credit to low-quality borrowers, allocating more credit to those ﬁrms, as
demonstrated by Peek and Rosengren (2005). In contrast to the case of market capital
constraints, regulatory capital constraints in forbearance lending were observed only for
banks with higher regulatory capital, which faced lower market capital ratios. Furthermore,
the above ﬁndings for the market and the regulatory capital measures are observed in a
robust manner when we control for the survivorship bias of bank–ﬁrm relationships, and
do not depend on whether we adopt linear or nonlinear speciﬁcations. In the next section,
we will explore the real world of lending by Japanese distressed banks while simultaneously
controlling for the two capital measures and their interaction in the bank loan equation.
5. Uncovering the Real World In this section, we reveal the real world of distressed
banks’ lending behavior by controlling for the interaction of the two capital measures, or
the source of the misperception of bank balance sheet risk, in the bank loan equation. Thus,
we answer which of the two opposing views, stagnant lending by equity-constrained banks
or forbearance lending by banks with regulatory capital constraints, is a more appropriate
interpretation of troubled banks’ lending behavior in Japan’s postbubble period. Moreover,
we explore the determinants of the regulatory capital ratio and market capital ratio using
a cross-sectional regression for bank capital structure based on standard corporate ﬁnance
23
theory emphasizing market forces as its determinants. By doing so, we examine the reason
why the parallel worlds of the two opposing views emerged.
5.1. Controlling for the Two Bank Capital Ratio Measures Simultaneously In
this subsection, we simultaneously control for the market and regulatory capital ratios and
their interaction, thereby examining which of the two capital measures can explain bank
lending behavior. As shown in Figure 1, and as pointed out by the recent empirical studies
on bank balance sheet risk (Haldane and Madouros (2012), Haldane (2014), Bulow and
Klemperer (2015), Sarin and Summers (2016), and Begley et al. (2017)), highly negative
correlations between regulatory capital and the market value of equity capital are one piece
of evidence of the misperception problem in measuring bank balance sheet risk based on
the regulatory capital ratio. Taking into account that such negative correlations aﬀect
the estimation results for the bank loan equations and produce the two opposing views on
troubled banks’ lending behavior, we control for the source of misperception: the interaction
of the two capital measures. More concretely, we introduce the two interaction terms
REGCAPit ∗MARCAPit and REGCAPit ∗MARCAPit ∗FIRMjt . The double interaction term
(REGCAPit ∗MARCAPit) and the triple interaction term (REGCAPit ∗MARCAPit ∗FIRMjt)
are included to control for the interaction between the regulatory capital ratio and the
market capital ratio, and for the allocation eﬀect through the interaction of the two capital
measures, respectively. By including the two interaction terms in the bank loan equation
in order to investigate the source of misperception, we control for the interaction eﬀect of
the two capital measures and thus address distressed banks’ lending behavior in a more
comprehensive way.
Table 6 shows the estimation results obtained by simultaneously controlling for the two
capital measures and the two interaction terms in bank loan equations (1) and (2). As shown
in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) of panels (A) and (B), the simultaneous inclusion of the two
capital measures yields signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the two capital measures (REGCAP and
MARCAP), and for their two interaction terms with the ﬁrm variables (REGCAP ∗ FIRM
and MARCAP ∗ FIRM). However, the inclusion of the interaction terms between the two
capital measures (REGCAP ∗ MARCAP and REGCAP ∗ MARCAP ∗ FIRM) eliminates the
signiﬁcance of the regulatory capital ratio as well as that of the two interaction terms
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between the regulatory capital ratio and the ﬁrm variables, as shown in columns (3), (4),
(7), and (8). These results indicate that stagnant lending in a capital crunch, but not
forbearance lending to low-quality borrowers, prevailed overall in the Japanese banking
system during the postbubble period.
Tables 7 and 8 report the results based on the subsample regressions for banks with high,
medium, and low levels of market and regulatory capital. As with the full-sample regression
in Table 6, the subsample regressions for banks with low, medium, and high market capital
ratios in panel (A) also yielded signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the two capital measures and
their two interaction terms with the ﬁrm variables. However, again, controlling for the
interaction between the two capital measures eliminates the signiﬁcance of the regulatory
capital ratio and the two interaction terms between it and the ﬁrm variables.
However, unlike the full-sample regression, the subsample regression for banks with
high regulatory capital yields positive coeﬃcients for the double interaction terms be-
tween the regulatory capital ratio and the ﬁrm performance variable (REGCAP ∗ FQ and
REGCAP ∗ FDD), as shown in columns (21) to (24) of Tables 7 and 8. Furthermore, note
that the market capital ratio (MARCAP) for the banks with high regulatory capital has
a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient, but that for the banks with low and medium regula-
tory capital does not, implying that only high regulatory capital ratios have systematically
negative correlations with the market capital ratio (see the sample mean of the regulatory
capital ratio and the market capital ratio in panel (B) of Table 4). These results suggest
that only banks with low market capital and high regulatory capital allocated more credit
to low-quality borrowers, while decreasing credit overall in a capital crunch.
5.2. Banks with a Low Market Capital Ratio and High Regulatory Capital
Ratio To furtherer investigate the possibility that the forbearance lending view could
still be accurate for banks with a low market capital ratio and high regulatory capital
ratio, we estimate bank loan equations (1) and (2) using the sample of banks in the third
tertile (above the 67th percentile) based on the market capital ratio and the ﬁrst tertile
(below the 34th percentile) for the regulatory capital ratio.
Table 9 reports the estimation results obtained by simultaneously controlling for the
market and regulatory capital ratios. We observe that only the market capital ratio
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(MARCAP) is signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, but not the interaction terms of the regula-
tory capital ratio and the ﬁrm performance variable (REGCAP ∗FQ and REGCAP ∗FDD),
as shown in panels (A) and (B) of Table 9.
Given that the market capital ratio remains signiﬁcant, bank lending behavior in Japan’s
postbubble period, or pre-banking-crisis period, of the late 1990s should be characterized as
stagnant lending by banks subject to equity capital constraints in a capital crunch, instead
of as forbearance lending.
5.3. Determinants of the Market and Regulatory Capital Ratios In the previ-
ous subsection, we demonstrated that bank lending behavior in Japan’s postbubble period
can be characterized as a capital crunch in which banks with equity capital constraints
decreased credit to borrowers irrespective of borrowers’ risk levels. Here, we examine the
reason why the two bank capital measures moved in opposite directions and the two oppos-
ing views emerged. To this end, we analyze the determinants of the market and regulatory
capital ratios, following the empirical analyses of Flannery and Rangan (2008) and Gropp
and Heider (2010). These studies attempted to identify the determinants of bank capi-
tal structures using cross-sectional regressions. Their econometric speciﬁcation based on
corporate ﬁnance theory are is follows:
BCAPit = α0 + α1BQit−1 + α2σit−1 + α3PROFit−1 + α4 ln SIZEit−1 + α5COLit−1 + it, (3)
where BCAP is the regulatory capital ratio or market capital ratio. The explanatory vari-
ables are the bank’s Tobin’s q, or the bank charter value (BQ), the logarithmic value of
the bank’s asset volatility, or the bank’s total risk exposure (σ), proﬁtability (PROF), the
logarithmic value of total assets (SIZE), and the value of collateral assets (COL). We in-
clude the bank’s Tobin’s q and asset volatility, deﬁned in the same manner as the ﬁrm’s
Tobin’s q and asset volatility (see Subsection 3.1). We deﬁne the proﬁtability as the
return on assets in percentage terms, and the collateral assets as 100 × (Liquid Assets +
Tangible Assets)/Total Assets.20 All variables are lagged by one year. The regression also
20 More concretely, we deﬁne Liquid Assets as Total Securities + Treasury Bills + Other Bills + Bonds +
CDs+Cash and Tangible Assets such as Land and Buildings+Other Tangible Assets (see also Gropp and
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includes time and bank ﬁxed eﬀects (year and ui) to control for unobserved heterogeneity
across time and among banks that may be correlated with the explanatory variables. Table
10 reports the summary statistics for those variables.
In Subsection 4.3, we found that the use of the market capital ratio as a measure of
bank balance sheet risk leads to evidence that banks with a lower market capital ratio
were more severely capital constrained in their lending than those with a medium or higher
capital ratio, although all Japanese banks faced a capital crunch. However, we found that
use of the regulatory capital ratio leads to evidence that only banks with higher regulatory
capital engaged in forbearance lending. To incorporate these ﬁndings into our analysis of
bank capital structure, we also estimate equation (3) by additionally including interaction
terms between the ﬁve explanatory variables and the lower-market-capital dummy in the
regression for the market capital ratio, and interaction terms between the ﬁve explanatory
variables and the higher-regulatory-capital dummy in the regression for the regulatory
capital ratio. Thus, we provide a detailed analysis of why there are two opposing views
regarding troubled banks’ lending behavior.
The explanatory variables in equation (3) are conventional ones for explaining capital
structure on the basis of standard corporate ﬁnance theory emphasizing market forces.21
According to this so-called market view, banks’ Tobin’s q is expected to have a positive
coeﬃcient because banks would protect a valuable charter by lowering their leverage and
thus by lowering their default risk. Moreover, bank proﬁt would also have a positive
coeﬃcient, as higher proﬁts and sticky dividends allow banks to accumulate capital. Banks’
total risk exposure, deﬁned as asset volatility, should also have a positive coeﬃcient based
on the inference that counterparties demanded more equity protection from banks with
greater portfolio risk and business uncertainty. However, there is no clear prediction on
how collateral and size aﬀect capital building in terms of standard corporate ﬁnance theory.
In contrast to the corporate ﬁnance view (or the market view), one alternative view places
emphasis on the impact of capital regulation. It predicts that the standard corporate
ﬁnance determinants have little or no explanatory power because market forces are not the
Heider (2010)).
21 Corporate ﬁnance theory regarding capital structure documents the role of dividends. However, we do
not include an indicator for dividend payers because all the banks in our sample pay dividends.
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main driving force for banks to build up their capital. The other alternative is the “buﬀer”
view, according to which banks tend to hold capital buﬀers above minimum regulatory
requirement levels to avoid the costs that arise from issuing equity at short notice (see
Gropp and Heider (2010) for the buﬀer view). This buﬀer view predicts that banks with
higher proﬁts and higher Tobin’s q are likely to be more leveraged because such banks face
fewer asymmetric information problems, and their costs associated with issuing equity are
relatively low.
Table 11 shows the results for the regressions for the market and regulatory capital
ratios. In this table, we observe that the two capital ratios have quite diﬀerent results,
which well characterize the capital building behavior by Japanese banks in the late 1990s.
More concretely, standard corporate ﬁnance variables signiﬁcantly determine the market
capital ratio, while none of them determines the regulatory capital ratio. This means that
during the postbubble period, or the pre-banking-crisis period, in the late 1990s, banks’
equity capital reﬂected normal market forces, but their regulatory capital did not. In other
words, in that period, neither the market view nor the buﬀer view is applicable to the
regulatory capital ratio.
A signiﬁcantly positive estimate for the Tobin’s q (BQ) indicates that the market capital
ratio is associated with banks’ charter value, or future cash ﬂows, while the regulatory
capital ratio is not. Given that the sample mean of the regulatory capital ratio continued
to increase, but that of the market capital ratio continued to decrease during the late 1990s,
we infer that Japanese banks were not able to maintain their market capital to protect a
valuable charter given the deteriorating Japanese economic conditions, while they were
able to somehow increase regulatory capital, irrespective of the decreasing charter value.22
In other words, as the charter value decreases, banks tend to become more leveraged (see
Calomiris and Nissim (2014) on United States banks).23
The positive coeﬃcient for banks’ total risk exposure (σ) suggests that Japanese banks
were substantially subject to market forces: counterparties demanded more equity protec-
tion from banks with greater portfolio risk (see, e.g., Hackbarth et al. (2006), Flannery
22 In the late 1990s, low bank proﬁts also contributed to the decrease in the market capital ratio.
23 Calomiris and Nissim (2014) examined declines in United States banks’ Tobin’s q after the ﬁnancial
crisis and showed that the declines reﬂected the erosion of future proﬁts.
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and Rangan (2008), Valencia (2016), and Corbae et al. (2017)). However, banks facing
greater business uncertainty were not able to build up equity capital during the postbubble
period. Indeed, as shown in Figure 5, the market capital ratio continued to decrease during
Japan’s pre-banking-crisis period in the late 1990s, while banks’ asset volatility remained
stable. By contrast, the insigniﬁcant estimate for the regulatory capital ratio implies that
Japanese banks built up regulatory book capital without being exposed to market forces.
The estimation results for Tobin’s q and risk exposure highlight the diﬀerence between the
responses of the market and regulatory capital ratios to market forces.
However, even in the regression for the market capital ratio, Tobin’s q and banks’ total
risk exposure have diﬀerent estimates depending on whether a bank enters into the lower-
market-capital group or not. More concretely, the interaction term of Tobin’s q and the
lower-market-capital dummy does not have signiﬁcant estimates, whereas that of banks’
risk exposure has signiﬁcantly negative estimates, implying that the market capital ratio
of the lower-market-capital banks reﬂects their portfolio risk less well. This is primarily
because such banks were not able to issue equity and increase market capital, even if they
faced greater portfolio risk or tried to take on more risk.
The estimation results for the other explanatory variables in the market capital equation
are also quite consistent with corporate ﬁnance theory and previous research on bank capital
structure (Flannery and Rangan (2008) and Gropp and Heider (2010)), but those in the
regulatory capital equation are not. Also note that the insensitivity of regulatory capital
to the conventional explanatory variables is observed in all Japanese banks—with lower,
medium, and higher levels of regulatory capital.
We ﬁnd that proﬁtability (PROF) has a signiﬁcantly positive estimate for the market
capital ratio, as does Tobin’s q, indicating that banks tend to accumulate proﬁts to increase
their market capitalization (see Berger (1995)) with a view to maintaining a high charter
value. However, for banks with lower market capital ratios, proﬁtability has less eﬀect on
market capital than for those with higher market capital ratios. This pattern is observed
in the estimates for the bank assets risk measure but not for Tobin’s q. One of the possible
reasons for the diﬀerence in these variables’ impacts on market capital is that banks with
lower market capital are more likely to face lower equity values and consequently have
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diﬃculty in issuing equity, given the high volatility in their assets. Thus, their market
capital is less sensitive to their total risk exposure and proﬁts. Another explanation for the
heterogeneity in the impacts of proﬁts is that the “buﬀer” view starts to become eﬀective
as banks’ market capital ratios decrease: i.e., banks with less capital make eﬀorts to ﬁnd a
way to increase their regulatory capital as a buﬀer against their proﬁts decreasing, which
weakens the positive association with bank market capital.
Bank size (SIZE) and collateral assets (COLL) have signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcients
for the regression with the market capital ratio, and the results do not depend on banks’
capital level because the interaction eﬀects are not signiﬁcant. The positive coeﬃcient
for bank size implies that larger banks hold more equity capital, but regulatory capital is
accumulated irrespective of bank size. The positive coeﬃcient for collateral assets (COLL)
in the market capital equation implies that an increase in banks’ collateral assets induces
them to increase their market capitalization. This is probably because such an increase
in banks’ collateral assets is favored by market participants, and thus larger amounts of
collateral may contribute to banks’ market capital.
Summing up our estimation results, the mechanisms determining the market and reg-
ulatory capital ratios are quite diﬀerent. The normal market forces measured by the ex-
planatory variables based on standard corporate ﬁnance theory— charter value, portfolio
risk, proﬁtability, bank size, and collateral assets—matter in diﬀerentiating the mechanisms
that determine the two bank capital measures. The market capital ratio is strongly subject
to normal market forces, but the regulatory capital ratio is not. Furthermore, for banks
with low market capital, their proﬁts and asset risk have less signiﬁcant eﬀects on market
capital, although Tobin’s q has almost the same magnitude of eﬀect across banks with dif-
ferent market capital levels. This result suggests that in the late 1990s in Japan, although
lowly market-capitalized banks struggled to increase market capital while facing a low char-
ter value, low proﬁts, and high asset volatility, their market capital continued to decline
as their value in capital markets deteriorated. However, Japanese banks increased their
regulatory capital independently of market forces. This is probably because, as discussed
in Subsection 2.2, the regulatory forbearance policy in Japan’s postbubble period allowed
Japanese banks to window-dress and patch-up their regulatory (that is, book) capital by
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overvaluing assets.
5.4. The Real World of Japan’s Postbubble Period By simultaneously controlling
for the market and regulatory capital ratios and the interaction of these two capital mea-
sures in the bank loan equations, we demonstrated that the signiﬁcance of the regulatory
capital ratio vanishes, but the signiﬁcance of the market capital ratio survives. Moreover,
these results are robust even if we group Japanese banks into those with lower, medium,
and higher levels of market or regulatory capital and then run the subsample regressions.
The results indicate that in reality, distressed Japanese banks’ lending behavior should be
described as stagnant lending in a capital crunch, not as forbearance lending. In particu-
lar, banks with a lower market capital ratio were more severely subject to equity capital
constraints in the capital crunch.
We also identiﬁed the determinants of the market and regulatory capital ratios of
Japanese banks, and thereby why the two seemingly parallel worlds of distressed banks’
lending emerged, depending on which of the two bank capital measures is used in the
bank loan equations. Surprisingly, none of the standard corporate ﬁnance variables explain
Japanese banks’ regulatory capital, while they do explain banks’ market capital. This
implies that Japanese banks engaged in patching-up of their regulatory capital at their
discretion under the regulatory forbearance policy, completely independently of normal
market forces. However, while banks were window-dressing their regulatory (or book) cap-
ital, their market capital ratio was substantively aﬀected by normal market forces. That
is, as banks can increase their regulatory capital at their discretion, or there is an opportu-
nity for arbitrage in increasing regulatory capital, the main determinant of bank lending is
market capital, which is evaluated by equity market participants and depositors, and thus
is exposed to normal market forces.
As discussed above, Japanese banks faced a capital crunch. In particular, banks in
the lower-market-capital group were more severely subject to equity capital constraints in
lending. We demonstrated that the market capital ratio of such banks was less sensitive to
their portfolio risk and proﬁtability. This ﬁnding implies that the stagnant bank lending
in a capital crunch would worsen in the situation where counterparties require more equity
protection from lower-market-capital banks, but those banks are not able to build up
31
adequate capital relative to their portfolio risk and proﬁtability. In the next section, we
will examine the relation between the capital crunch and determinants of capital in more
detail.
6. The Key Driver in the Real World In this section, we estimate the bank loan
model by additionally controlling for the determinants of the market capital ratio—not
only the two corporate ﬁnance variables, but also the other three variables—in order to
identify the key driver of the observed capital crunch.
6.1. Controlling for Determinants of Market Capital Ratios Here, we report the
estimation results for the bank loan equation including not only the market capital ratio,
but also the ﬁve explanatory variables previously included in the regression for the market
capital ratio (see Subsection 5.3). The purpose of this test is to identify the key driver of the
observed capital crunch by examining which of the ﬁve determinants of the market capital
ratio eliminates the signiﬁcance of the market capital ratio.24 If one of the determinants
supersedes the market capital ratio, it is a key driver of the observed capital crunch. Table
12 reports the estimation results obtained by additionally including the ﬁve determinants
of the market capital ratio.
We observe that only banks’ portfolio risk, or banks’ total risk exposure, eliminates the
signiﬁcance of the market capital ratio, and it has a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient. Note
that both portfolio risk and proﬁtability have less explanatory power for the market capital
ratio of lowly market-capitalized banks (see Subsection 5.3). However, proﬁtability appears
not to supersede the market capital ratio in the bank loan equation. This indicates that
the diﬃculty of increasing capital corresponds to asset risk, rather than low proﬁtability,
and is the main cause of the capital crunch (see Hackbarth et al. (2006)).25
24 We do not include the interaction term of the market capital ratio and the ﬁrm performance variable—
the borrower’s Tobin’q or distance to default—because this interaction eﬀect was not signiﬁcant in a
statistically robust manner, as demonstrated in Section 4.
25 Hackbarth et al. (2006) theoretically demonstrated that ﬁrm asset volatility is the main driver of
ﬁrm-value-based optimal leverage, which is endogenously determined so that an increase in asset volatility
leads to a substantial decrease in optimal leverage. This theoretical view suggests that Japanese banks
were not able to maintain adequate market capital relative to their asset risk in the capital crunch during
Japan’s postbubble period.
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7. Conclusion We provide three substantive conclusions. First, the misperception of
bank balance sheet risk leads to a misunderstanding of distressed banks’ lending behavior
by generating “parallel worlds.” This problem of misunderstanding is exacerbated when a
proxy for bank balance sheet risk contains no information about bank balance sheet risk,
as in the Japanese economy in the late 1990s. The use of regulatory capital, which reﬂects
neither bank balance sheet risk nor normal market forces, provides evidence of forbearance
lending in which lowly capitalized banks allocated more credit to low-quality borrowers,
as demonstrated by Peek and Rosengren (2005). However, the use of the market value of
bank capital, which correctly reﬂects bank balance sheet risk and normal market forces,
provides evidence of the existence of a capital crunch in which lowly capitalized banks
decreased credit to all borrowers even if they were good borrowers, as demonstrated by
Gan (2007) and Watanabe (2007). These results are robust even if we employ the same
type of nonlinear speciﬁcation as Peek and Rosengren (2005) and if we use each bank’s
lending exposure to real estate in the bubble period instead of the market capital measure,
as in Gan (2007) and Watanabe (2007).
Second, we ﬁnd that the “real world” of distressed banks’ lending behavior should be
elucidated in terms of whether a proxy of bank balance sheet risk correctly reﬂects normal
market forces emphasized in the literature on capital structure: creditors demand more
equity from banks with greater uncertainty to secure an acceptable charter value. By
simultaneously controlling for the regulatory and market capital ratios, and the interaction
between them, in the bank loan equation, we demonstrated that only the coeﬃcient of the
market capital ratio, which is determined by normal market forces, remained signiﬁcant in
a robust manner. This indicates that distressed Japanese banks’ lending behavior should
be characterized as stagnant lending in a capital crunch, not forbearance lending.
Lastly, banks facing lower market capital levels and more severe equity capital con-
straints in lending are less sensitive to normal market forces, because such lowly capitalized
banks have more diﬃcultly in maintaining adequate equity capital relative to their total
risk exposure and business uncertainty. In other words, a capital crunch is attributable
to the uncertainty faced by lowly capitalized banks and their diﬃculty in increasing their
equity capital.
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Our ﬁndings suggest that the “parallel worlds,” or two opposing views on the lend-
ing behavior of troubled banks, emerged because regulatory capital does not reﬂect the
actual condition of increased risk on bank balance sheets, while market capital does. In
Japan’s postbubble period, banks with lower market capital levels decreased their supply
of credit, and engaged in the patching-up of their regulatory capital (i.e. book capital)
under regulatory forbearance policy. Such a capital crunch and regulatory arbitrage can
occur simultaneously whenever a bank is allowed to overvalue its portfolio and capital at its
partial discretion, although it shows up in Japan’s postbubble (pre-banking-crisis) period
as one of the most typical cases (see also, e.g., Haldane and Madouros (2012), Sarin and
Summers (2016), and Begley et al. (2017) on the United States case).
In stagnant lending because of a capital crunch, distressed banks with impaired capital
decreased credit whether their borrowing ﬁrms were low-quality or not. In contrast, in
forbearance lending, such distressed banks do not decrease credit, but reallocate credit
from good borrowers to bad borrowers. In other words, forbearance lending involves a
certain amount of risk-taking by the distressed banks, by betting on the future revival of
low-quality borrowers (see Fukuda and Nakamura (2008)), but in stagnant lending in a
capital crunch, distressed banks are involved in the process of credit contraction not only
for bad borrowers, but also for good borrowers. From this viewpoint, a capital crunch is a
more urgent situation for policy makers, and one in which restoring banks’ impaired capital
would bring about substantial improvement to the economy. If one uses regulatory capital
to specify the bank loan equation despite its weak link with bank balance sheet risk, it
would lead policy makers to implement the wrong policy based on a misunderstanding of
distressed banks’ lending behavior. In other words, our results suggest that it is important
to design policy requiring banks to increase their capital based on a substantive measure,
not a spurious one.
Appendix A: Estimation Results for Relation Survival Probability In Subsection
3.2, we included the inverse Mills ratio in the bank loan model to control for survival bias.
In this appendix, we show the estimation results of the probit model, which is used to
calculate the inverse Mills ratio.
As the literature on relationship banking pointed out, the continuation of a bank–
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ﬁrm relationship depends on both the bank’s and the ﬁrm’s characteristics. Our probit
regression includes one-period lags of banks’ market leverage ratio (MARCAP it−1), return
on assets (BROAit−1), size (BSIZEit−1), and the number of ﬁrm that have lending–borrowing
relationships with bank i (NUMBBit−1). Firm characteristics include one-period lags of
ﬁrms’ book leverage ratio (FBLEVjt−1), return on assets (FROAjt−1), interest coverage ratio
(FICRjt−1), size (FSIZEjt−1), and the number of banks that have relationships with ﬁrm
j (NUMBFjt−1). To control for the ﬁrm-level attributes, we also include dummy variables
for the industries to which ﬁrms belong. In addition to the bank–ﬁrm characteristics, our
probit regression includes one-period lags of bank i’s lending exposure to ﬁrm j (EXPLjit−1),
ﬁrm j’s borrowing exposure to bank i (EXPBjit−1), and the duration of the relationship
between lender i and borrowing ﬁrm j (DURATjit−1) as relationship factors.
26 We conduct
rolling estimation of the probit model year-by-year to incorporate time-varying eﬀects of
each variable. This year-by-year estimation means that we do not need to include time
dummies
Table A.1 shows the estimation results and indicates that a higher borrowing and lending
exposure and a longer duration of relationships are associated with a higher probability
of the continuation of relationships. Furthermore, ﬁrms with higher proﬁtability tend
to continue their relationships with lending banks. A lower ﬁrm’s interest coverage ratio
implies a higher probability of the continuation of the relationship, which suggests that ﬁrms
with a high dependence on debt funding tend to continue their relationships with banks.
We should also note that higher bank leverage was associated with a lower probability of the
continuation of relationships in the late 1990s. This suggests that in the late 1990s, a capital
crunch occurred in terms of relationship termination, as pointed out by Nakashima and
Takahashi (2018b). Overall, dependence on debt ﬁnance and higher ﬁrm proﬁtability, and
higher borrowing and lending exposure are associated with higher probability of relationship
continuation.
26 Borrowing exposure is calculated as bank i’s loans to ﬁrm j as a percentage of the total loans to ﬁrm
j, while lending exposure is calculated as ﬁrm j’s loans from bank i as a percentage of the total loans from
bank i.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Bank Loan Equations
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent Variables
Growth Rate of Loans (∆LOANjit) 120557 −2.141 27.588 −99.67 100
Loan Dummy 120557 .247 .431 0 1
Bank Capital Variables (BCAPit−1)
Market Capital Ratio 119380 6.434 3.315 .602 15.723
Regulatory Capital Ratio 120557 1.503 1.111 −5.01 9.48
Lending Exposure to Real Estate 120530 9.285 3.79 2.865 30.667
Firm Performance Variables (FIRMjt−1)
Tobin’s q (FQjt−1) 118643 126.399 37.563 41.436 892.367
Distance to Default (FDDjt−1) 118643 4.189 2.623 .625 134.772
Relationship Variables
Lending Exposure 120557 .034 .093 .000 1.987
Borrowing Exposure 120192 9.611 12.271 .000 100
Dummy Variable
Banks with Decreasing Regulatory 120557 .345 .475 0 1
Capital (BDECit−1)
Notes: The sample period for estimation is from March 1994 to March 1999. Lagged variables,
and all explanatory variables, are from March 1993 to March 1998. We exclude the top five
percentiles of the growth rate of loans outstanding as extreme values. The loan dummy equals
one if ∆LOAN is positive, and zero otherwise.
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Table 3: Estimation Results for Alternative Specifications of Bank Loan Equations
(A) Nonlinear Specification
Regulatory Capital Market Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BCAP −0.00285 −0.0176*** 0.0357*** 0.0191***
(0.0111) (0.00579) (0.00321) (0.00196)
BCAP · FQ −0.0000596 −0.000145***
(0.0000875) (0.0000226)
BCAP · FDD 0.00212* −0.000475
(0.00112) (0.000331)
Lending Exposure 0.342*** 0.344*** 0.445*** 0.446***
(0.0555) (0.0555) (0.0575) (0.0575)
Borrowing Exposure 0.0146*** 0.0146*** 0.0138*** 0.0137***
(0.000387) (0.000387) (0.000391) (0.000391)
Firm Fix. Eff. yes yes yes yes
Obs. 123648 123648 122453 122453
(B) Use of Lending Exposure to Real Estate as the Bank Capital Variable
Lending Exposure to Real Estate
(5) (6) (7) (8)
BCAP −0.535*** −0.399***
(0.0657) (0.0361)
BCAP · FQ 0.000686 −0.000212
(0.000499) (0.000568)
BCAP · FDD −0.0121 −0.00850
(0.00776) (0.00953)
Lending Exposure 4.472*** 5.645*** 4.435*** 5.638***
(0.936) (0.894) (0.936) (0.893)
Borrowing Exposure 0.0527*** 0.0329*** 0.0526*** 0.0329***
(0.00712) (0.00808) (0.00712) (0.00808)
Firm-Year Fix. Eff. yes yes yes yes
Bank-Year Fix. Eff. yes yes
Obs. 118261 118261 118261 118261
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at levels of 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01, respectively. In panel (A), BCAP denotes the regulatory capital ratio of a lending bank
in columns (1) and (2), while it denotes the market capital ratio in columns (3) and (4). In panel (B),
BCAP denotes banks’ lending exposure to real estate in 1989. FQ and FDD denote Tobin’s q and
the distance to default of borrowing firms, respectively. In the nonlinear specification, we run a probit
regression with borrowing-firm random effects, as in Peek and Rosengren (2005), whose dependent
variable is an indicator variable that equals one if ∆LOAN is positive, and zero otherwise. The probit
regression also includes time dummy variables. In the linear regression in panel (B), we do not include
bank fixed effects because lending exposure to real estate is a time-invariant bank variable.
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Table 6: Estimation Results for Bank Loan Equations Simultaneously Controlling
for the Two Bank Capital Ratio Measures
(A) Tobin’s q (FQ)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
REGCAP −0.555** −0.438
(0.283) (0.492)
REGCAP · FQ 0.00676*** 0.00495** 0.00803** 0.00116
(0.00224) (0.00229) (0.00391) (0.00403)
MARCAP 0.379*** 0.413**
(0.112) (0.176)
MARCAP · FQ −0.00130** 0.000523 −0.00101 −0.000625
(0.000644) (0.000652) (0.00120) (0.00124)
REGCAP · MARCAP −0.0419
(0.0885)
REGCAP · MARCAP · FQ −0.000202 0.000755
(0.000668) (0.000701)
Firm-Year Fix. Eff. yes yes yes yes
Bank Fix. Eff. yes yes
Bank-Year Fix. Eff. yes yes
Obs. 117139 117139 117139 117139
(B) Distance to Default (FDD)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
REGCAP 0.0576 0.257
(0.144) (0.259)
REGCAP · FDD 0.0493* −0.00984 0.0633 −0.0476
(0.0286) (0.0305) (0.0531) (0.0659)
MARCAP 0.250*** 0.304***
(0.0784) (0.0981)
MARCAP · FDD −0.0145* −0.0117 −0.0115 −0.0242
(0.00870) (0.00919) (0.0137) (0.0148)
REGCAP · MARCAP −0.0537
(0.0427)
REGCAP · MARCAP · FDD −0.00231 0.00704
(0.00655) (0.00837)
Firm-Year Fix. Eff. yes yes yes yes
Bank Fix. Eff. yes yes
Bank-Year Fix. Eff. yes yes
Obs. 117139 117139 117139 117139
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance
at levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. REGCAP and MARCAP denote the
regulatory and market capital ratios of lending banks, respectively. FQ denotes the
Tobin’s q of borrowing firms in panel (A) and FDD denotes the distance to default
in panel (B). Estimated coefficients for lending and borrowing exposures and the
inverse Mills ratio are not reported.
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Table 9: Estimation Results for Bank Loan Equations for Banks with
Low Market and High Regulatory Capital
(A) Tobin’s q (FQ)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
REGCAP −1.366 3.629*
(0.915) (1.878)
REGCAP · FQ 0.0167** 0.0146* −0.0113 −0.0148
(0.00733) (0.00750) (0.0150) (0.0149)
MARCAP 3.304*** 9.243***
(0.974) (2.048)
MARCAP · FQ −0.00612 −0.0000720 −0.0371** −0.0313**
(0.00614) (0.00627) (0.0150) (0.0150)
REGCAP · MARCAP −2.059***
(0.670)
REGCAP · MARCAP · FQ 0.0113** 0.0123**
(0.00529) (0.00524)
Firm-Year Fix. Eff. yes yes yes yes
Bank Fix. Eff. yes yes
Bank-Year Fix. Eff. yes yes
Obs. 20435 20435 20435 20435
(B) Distance to Default (FDD)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
REGCAP −0.249 2.146*
(0.494) (1.099)
REGCAP · FDD 0.250** 0.180 0.0513 −0.0211
(0.110) (0.110) (0.237) (0.244)
MARCAP 2.518*** 5.602***
(0.667) (1.249)
MARCAP · FDD 0.00899 0.0124 −0.218 −0.214
(0.0907) (0.0924) (0.217) (0.225)
REGCAP · MARCAP −0.982**
(0.387)
REGCAP · MARCAP · FDD 0.0709 0.0921
(0.0843) (0.0875)
Obs. 20435 20435 20435 20435
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance
at levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. REGCAP and MARCAP denote the
regulatory and market capital ratios of lending banks, respectively. FQ denotes the
Tobin’s q of borrowing firms in panel (A) and FDD denotesthe distance to default in
panel (B). Estimated coefficients for lending and borrowing exposures, the inverse
Mills ratio, and the presence or absence of fixed effects are not reported.
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Table 10: Summary Statistics for Bank Capital Equations
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Market Capital Ratio 710 5.359 2.273 .602 15.723
Regulatory Capital Ratio 824 1.388 1.391 −5.01 9.48
Bank Charter Value (BQit−1) 704 102.24 2.136 98.272 114.997
Profitability (PROFit−1) 824 .066 .298 −2.61 .598
Log (Total Assets) (SIZEit−1) 824 14.727 1.365 12.303 18.171
Collateral Assets (COLit−1) 824 23.409 5.943 11.596 44.308
Log (Asset Volatility) (σit−1) 704 .225 .697 −4.531 2.62
Notes: Estimation samples are from March 1993 to March 1998. Lagged vari-
ables, and all explanatory variables, are from March 1992 to March 1997.
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Table 11: Estimation Results for the Market and Regulatory
Capital Ratios Using Market-Based Explanatory Variables
(A) Market Capital Ratio (B) Regulatory Capital Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BQ 0.259*** 0.226*** BQ 0.0695 0.0703
(0.0431) (0.0523) (0.0447) (0.0427)
PROF 0.315** 1.200*** PROF 0.325 0.0635
(0.145) (0.300) (0.242) (0.160)
SIZE 1.997** 1.931** SIZE 1.003 1.105
(0.959) (0.957) (1.204) (1.065)
COL 0.0813*** 0.0799*** COL 0.0151 0.0127
(0.0245) (0.0262) (0.0231) (0.0235)
σ 0.204** 0.419** σ 0.0675 0.0809
(0.0959) (0.161) (0.0847) (0.0863)
DMlow· BQ 0.0811 DRhigh· BQ −0.0840
(0.0944) (0.0799)
DMlow· PROF −1.145*** DRhigh· PROF 1.031***
(0.315) (0.357)
DMlow· SIZE −0.0606 DRhigh· SIZE −0.0526
(0.165) (0.164)
DMlow· COL −0.0264 DRhigh· COL 0.00190
(0.0218) (0.0237)
DMlow · σ −0.244* DRhigh · σ 0.0795
(0.141) (0.241)
DMlow −6.604 DRhigh 9.212
(9.783) (8.682)
Constant −52.88*** −48.60*** Constant −21.54 −23.04
(15.94) (17.28) (19.36) (17.40)
Obs. 701 701 Obs. 704 704
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote signifi-
cance at levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. The dependent variable is the
market capital ratio in panel (A), and the regulatory capital ratio in panel (B).
DMlow denotes a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is classified as having
a low market capital ratio, and zero otherwise. DMhigh denotes a dummy variable
that equals one if a bank is classified as having a high regulatory capital ratio,
and zero otherwise. Estimated equations also include time dummy variables and
bank fixed effects.
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Table 12: Estimation Results for Bank Loan Equations with Determinants
of the Market Capital Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MARCAP 0.224*** 1.380*** 0.193*** 0.315*** 0.252*** −0.00746
(0.0676) (0.245) (0.0685) (0.0678) (0.0726) (0.0728)
BQ −1.061***
(0.215)
PROF 0.564**
(0.247)
SIZE 13.09***
(1.080)
COL −0.0319
(0.0326)
σ 3.045***
(0.364)
Firm-Year Fix. Eff. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank Fix. Eff. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 119018 119018 119018 119018 119018 119018
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at levels of
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. The dependent variable is ∆LOAN, which indicates the growth
rate of the total amount of loans outstanding. Estimated coefficients for lending and borrowing
exposures and the inverse Mills ratio are not reported.
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Table A.1: Estimation Result for the Survival Model of Borrower–Lender
Relationships
Fiscal Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
MARCAP −0.00442∗∗∗ −0.0299∗∗∗ −0.0590∗∗∗ −0.0222∗ −0.0114∗∗∗ −0.0127∗∗∗ −0.0100∗∗∗
(−3.52) (−3.46) (−6.03) (−1.69) (−3.19) (−3.25) (−3.02)
BSIZE −0.0379 0.0481 0.212∗∗∗ 0.0997∗∗ −0.0320 −0.0327 −0.0735∗
(−0.90) (1.14) (5.16) (2.17) (−0.91) (−0.79) (−1.88)
BROA 0.0600∗∗∗ −0.00920 0.128∗∗∗ 0.0539∗∗ 0.0834∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(5.03) (−0.66) (4.97) (2.54) (4.47) (3.15) (2.93)
FLEV −0.00533∗∗ −0.00102 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.000600 0.00173 −0.00350∗∗∗ −0.00681∗∗∗
(−2.00) (−0.40) (5.97) (0.24) (0.66) (−3.31) (−2.72)
FSIZE 0.0369 0.852∗∗∗ 0.106 0.364∗∗∗ 0.108 0.231∗∗ −0.0156
(0.32) (7.51) (1.31) (3.91) (1.12) (2.47) (−0.20)
FROA 0.00525∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.00908∗∗∗ 0.00101 0.00771∗∗∗ 0.00522∗∗∗ 0.00405∗∗
(2.13) (6.32) (3.34) (0.62) (3.20) (2.59) (2.24)
FICR 0.00000957∗∗∗ 0.00000129 0.00000177∗∗ −0.000000292 0.00000476∗∗ −0.00000275 0.00000221∗∗
(3.72) (0.41) (2.34) (−0.22) (2.26) (−1.42) (2.12)
DURAT 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.00977∗∗∗ 0.0126∗∗∗ 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.0173∗∗∗
(7.09) (6.70) (7.79) (6.20) (7.93) (7.52) (10.17)
EXPL 0.0233∗∗∗ 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.000290 0.0732∗∗∗ 0.0119∗ 0.0964∗∗∗ 0.0291∗∗∗
(4.35) (3.89) (0.05) (6.44) (1.82) (6.78) (3.25)
EXPB 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0142∗∗∗ 0.00871∗∗∗ 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗ 0.00979∗∗∗
(11.41) (11.90) (12.92) (8.71) (12.15) (9.63) (9.24)
NUMBL 0.158∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗
(5.43) (8.06) (9.54) (7.43) (7.94) (9.75) (10.66)
NUMBB 0.136∗∗∗ −0.0153 −0.187∗∗∗ −0.00246 0.0348 0.116∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(2.98) (−0.35) (−4.35) (−0.05) (0.95) (2.75) (3.40)
N 21747 18169 18298 16710 14653 13763 13799
Notes: This table shows the estimation results of the model with industry fixed effects. The dependent variable is the
survival dummy variable, which equals one if the borrower–lender relationship continues in year t, and otherwise zero. We
also include five-year moving average values of the firm ROA, interest coverage ratio, book leverage ratio, and size to control
for time-varying firm fixed effects. The estimated coefficients are not shown in the table. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and
10% levels of significance, respectively. t statistics are in parentheses.
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Figure 1: The Bank Market Capital Ratio and Regulatory Capital Surplus
Notes: The solid line represents the mean bank market capital ratio in each year, and the dashed line represents the
mean bank regulatory capital surplus in each year.
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Figure 2: Scatterplot of the Bank Market Capital Ratio and Regulatory Capital Surplus
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Figure 3: The Market and Regulatory Capitals of Banks That Went Bankrupt
Notes: The left panel shows the market capital ratio and regulatory capital surplus of Fukutoku Bank, which went
bankrupt in May 1998. The right panel shows the two capital measures for the Long-Term Credit Bank (LTCB), which
went bankrupt in October 1998. In both panels, the solid line represents the market capital ratio (which corresponds
to the left axis), while the dashed line represents the regulatory capital surplus (which corresponds to the right axis).
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Figure 4: Lending Exposure to Real Estate and the Two Bank Capital Ratios
Notes: The left panel is a scatterplot of lending exposure to real estate and the regulatory capital surplus, and the
right panel is that of lending exposure to real estate and the market capital ratio.
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(B) Market Capital
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Figure 5: Average Supply Effects of Bank Capital on Lending
Notes: Dots represent point estimates of the average marginal effects of the bank capital measure, BCAP, at a
representative value of the firm performance variables in the bank loan equations reported in Table 2. The capped
vertical lines represent 95 % confidence intervals calculated by the delta method. Shadowed areas are histograms of
the firm performance variables corresponding to the right axis.
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Figure 6: The Bank Market Capital Ratio and Asset Volatility
Notes: The solid line represents the mean bank market capital ratio in each year, as in Figure 1, and the dashed line
represents the mean logarithmic value of bank asset volatility in each year.
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